On June 11, 2026, Israel’s Privacy Protection Authority published a draft for public comment on protecting privacy in the use of age assurance tools online. Unlike the two final position papers we recently covered, on consent and on cross-border data transfers, this is still a draft, and may change before a final version is adopted. Even so, the direction it sets is already clear, and relevant to any site, app, social network, or gaming service considering an age-check for its users.
The document is addressed to website operators, social networks, online gaming companies, and other online service providers, as well as their legal counsel and privacy officers. Failing to meet the applicable legal requirements can lead to financial sanctions under the Privacy Protection Law, alongside exposure to civil claims.
Age assurance: not yet a legal duty in Israel, but a fast-spreading tool
Worth clarifying upfront: as of the draft’s publication, the Authority isn’t aware of any Israeli law or regulation that requires the use of age assurance tools. In other words, if you’re considering implementing an age check, it’s currently a voluntary step, usually driven by content policy, business considerations, or foreign regulation, not a duty the Israeli Authority imposes on you. But once you decide to use such a tool, it’s fully subject to privacy law, because it inherently involves collecting and processing personal data.
"Age assurance" is a general term for various tools meant to provide an estimate, at varying levels of certainty and accuracy, of the age of users of online services. It’s used mainly for three reasons: preventing users from accessing a service based on age, tailoring a service’s content to the user’s age, and complying with legal or regulatory requirements. Used properly, it can help reduce children’s exposure to inappropriate content, but it also carries significant privacy risks, for children and adults alike.
Three methods, and not necessarily in ascending order of privacy risk
The draft maps three main age-assurance methods, in ascending order of the certainty they provide:
- Age declaration, the user states their age or birthdate, with no supporting evidence. Easy to bypass and less effective, but also less privacy-invasive.
- Age estimation, estimating an age or age range, based on real-time processing of biometric data (facial features, voice, movement), data derived from the user’s profile and online behavior, or knowledge tests compared against similar users.
- Age verification, a high-certainty indication, for example based on official documents like an ID card or driver’s license, sometimes combined with photo-ID matching, credit card details, or a trusted third party offering a reliable age-verification service, sometimes using a "zero-knowledge proof" technique that confirms only that the user is an adult, without exposing further details about them.
These methods can be used individually or combined (waterfall techniques), and the process can run once at entry, or be repeated over time, for example when there’s reason to suspect a user’s real age differs from what they declared at sign-up. Worth knowing: there are also alternatives that don’t involve collecting personal data at all, like content-filtering tools that block access to sites classified as harmful (which Israeli telecom providers are required to offer their customers free of charge), or redesigning the service flow so the age check only triggers when a user attempts to buy an age-restricted product, rather than at every site visit.
Why it’s risky for privacy, for minors and adults alike
Most age-assurance methods involve collecting and processing personal data, sometimes specially sensitive data. Official documents reveal not just a birthdate but also a birth country, parents’ names, and a signature. Biometric data reveals facial features or a voice. And even age estimation based on analyzing online behavior can indirectly reveal political views, religious beliefs, health status, or sexual orientation. The risks include leakage of the data collected, using it for other purposes like targeted advertising, collecting excess data not actually needed just to verify age (like parents’ names from an ID card), and situations where a user has no real ability to refuse, for example on an essential-service or public-body website.
More broadly, the draft warns that overly broad use of age-assurance tools could erode the anonymity of internet users generally, not just minors, and turn the online space into a more heavily monitored one. The Authority also flags a point worth remembering: while the privacy intrusion involved in these tools is clear and evident, their actual effectiveness, under any method, is disputed and even in doubt.
A privacy-risk tier system, and when the most invasive tools are justified
The draft sorts tools into three privacy-risk tiers: low (self-declaration, minimal data sourced only from the user), medium (knowledge tests, checks against a public database, credit card details, bank certification, zero-knowledge-proof-based third-party services), and high (real-time biometric processing, behavior-based estimation, and verification via official documents like an ID card). The Authority stresses that the classification depends on actual implementation: an ongoing, ongoing estimation method based on behavioral analysis can sometimes be more invasive than a one-time, document-based verification.
The Authority’s position is that using a high-privacy-risk tool will usually exceed what’s needed for age assurance, and is generally justified only where a legal or regulatory requirement specifically mandates such a tool, or where there’s a concrete, significant risk to minors that justifies it despite the serious privacy intrusion. In every other situation, organizations should prefer a medium- or low-risk tool, to the extent it suits the nature of the service and the level of risk involved.
Purpose limitation and data minimization: what’s collected for age assurance stays there
Data collected for age assurance may not be used for any other purpose, such as targeted advertising or identifying the user in an unrelated context, a principle set out in sections 2(9) and 8(b) of the Privacy Protection Law. To limit the intrusion, the draft recommends avoiding the parallel use of multiple age-assurance tools unless justified, choosing a tool that provides only the certainty level actually needed without exposing extra data (for example, a third-party service that confirms only that the user is an adult), choosing, within the chosen tool, data sources that minimize excess exposure, and after the process is complete, retaining only the minimal data needed to keep providing the service, for example a binary "minor/adult" flag rather than an exact birthdate, if that isn’t actually needed. Regulation 2(c) of the Privacy Protection (Data Security) Regulations, 5777-2017, already requires an annual review of excess data in databases, and it’s worth including data collected for age assurance in that review too.
Notice, consent, and when express consent is preferable
Collecting and processing data for age assurance requires either a legal basis or the data subject’s consent, and includes the standard notice duty under section 11 of the law. Given the sensitivity of the data and the risk involved, and because the collection may happen as part of a user’s everyday browsing routine, the draft recommends that organizations relying on consent obtain express consent, and avoid relying on implied consent wherever possible. Organizations that choose to proceed without consent, relying on the defenses in section 18 of the law, need to meet the proportionality requirement in section 20(b): using the least privacy-invasive tool possible under the circumstances, and being able to point to a legitimate interest that justifies the privacy intrusion without consent.
DPO appointment, data security, and contracting with external age-verification vendors
Using an age-assurance tool can itself trigger an organization’s duty to appoint a Data Protection Officer, if its core business involves significant-scale processing of sensitive data, or significant-scale, ongoing, systematic monitoring of users. An organization running a site, app, or service that uses an age-assurance tool is the controller of the database where the data is held, and is subject to all the data-security obligations under the Privacy Protection (Data Security) Regulations, 5777-2017. When contracting with an external vendor for age-verification services, regulation 15 of those regulations applies, requiring, among other things, an upfront assessment of the risks of the engagement, an explicit contractual definition of the data the vendor may process and for what purpose alone, a defined contract term and a deletion duty once it ends, and oversight of the vendor commensurate with the risk involved.
So what should you do this week?
- Remember the draft is still open for public comment, and track the final version before setting a permanent policy around it.
- If you already use, or are considering, an age-assurance tool, map exactly what data is collected, by which method, and how long it’s retained.
- Prefer the least invasive tool that’s actually sufficient for your purpose, and consider alternatives that don’t rely on personal data, like content filtering.
- Confirm any contract with an external age-verification vendor includes use limitation, a deletion duty, and oversight of its data-security compliance.
Using age-assurance tools isn’t yet a legal duty in Israel, but once you choose to use one, it’s fully subject to privacy law. "Estimation" can harm privacy just as much as "verification," it all depends on how it’s actually implemented.
Frequently asked questions
Is this final guidance or a draft?
It’s a draft for public comment, published on June 11, 2026. Unlike final position papers, the text may still change, so it’s worth tracking the final publication before setting a permanent policy around it, even though it’s worth starting to prepare in the direction it sets now.
Are we legally required to use age-assurance tools in Israel?
As of the draft’s publication, the Authority isn’t aware of any Israeli law or regulation requiring the use of age-assurance tools. Using them is currently voluntary, but once you decide to use such a tool, it’s fully subject to privacy law.
Which tool is least privacy-invasive?
Self-declaration is considered the lowest-risk tier, though also the least effective. Content-filtering tools that don’t rely on personal data at all, like blocking sites classified as harmful, involve no privacy intrusion at all, so they’re worth considering as an alternative.
Can we rely on implied consent (continued use) for age assurance?
The draft recommends avoiding this wherever possible. Given the sensitivity of the data and the risk involved, organizations relying on consent should obtain express, active consent from the user.
Could using an age-assurance tool trigger a duty to appoint a DPO?
Yes, in certain circumstances. If your core business involves significant-scale processing of sensitive data, or significant-scale, ongoing, systematic monitoring of users for age assurance, that can trigger the appointment duty.
What should a contract with an external age-verification vendor include?
Under regulation 15 of the Data Security Regulations, the contract should include, among other things, an explicit definition of the data the vendor may process and for what purpose alone, a defined contract term and a deletion duty once it ends, and a commitment to oversight commensurate with the risk.
The above is general information only and does not constitute legal advice. For guidance tailored to your specific circumstances — talk to us.
Want to know what applies to your company?
Talk to us